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The Uncertain Tax Definition of Partnerships: Problems
and Opportunities for Treatment of Terminal Losses
I. INTRODUCTION
Partnerships cannot always be readily distinguished from
debtor-creditor relationships. Since the tax treatment of losses
upon termination of these relationships differs, uncertainty as to
whether a taxpayer will be classified as a partner or a creditor
creates a number of problems and opportunities for the tax
planner.
Consider, for example, the business promoter who invests in
a high-risk enterprise and attempts to arrange the investment
transaction in that form which will maximize his profits if the
enterprise is successful and which will provide him with limited
liability and ordinary loss tax treatment in the event of failure.
One means of attaining these objectives is to set up a "loan"
agreement which provides that the principal be repaid out of
future earnings and that a share of the future profits be paid to
him in lieu of interest. This arrangement may, under state law,
avoid classification as a partnership and the consequent personal
liability of the investor to disappointed creditors of the business.
If the promoter has invested in connection with his trade or
business, he will claim a business bad debt deduction from ordi-
nary income if the business fails.' However, it is possible that
he might be considered a partner for tax purposes even though
he is not a partner under state law. If so, his loss upon with-
drawal of his interest in the enterprise will be treated as a capital
loss, 2 rather than as an ordinary loss, unless certain precautions
are taken.
This Note will first discuss the differences in the distinction
drawn between creditors and partners under state laws and that
drawn under the Internal Revenue Code. Discussion will then
shift to the applicability of the Corn Products doctrine to part-
nerships, the use of section 1231 assets in partnership distribu-
tions, and other devices which may provide a means of securing
ordinary loss treatment for terminal losses upon withdrawal
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 165, 166 [hereinafter INT. REv. CODE].
2. See text accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
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from a partnership. These planning techniques, though appli-
cable when the taxpayer is unquestionably a partner, take on
added significance when the taxpayer is uncertain as to whether
he will be considered a partner or a creditor.
II. DISTINGUISHING PARTNERS FROM CREDITORS
A. STATE LAW
The problem of distinguishing partners from creditors under
state law usually arises when a creditor of an unsuccessful en-
terprise seeks to fix liability for the firm's debts on one who,
though he invested in the enterprise in the form of a loan, has
many of the attributes of a partner, such as a share in the profits
or a voice in control of the business. Under the Uniform Part-
nership Act, which has been adopted in 40 states, profit sharing
is only prima facie evidence of a partnership relationship,3 and
even this inference is not to be drawn if the share in profits is
received as payment of a debt 4 or as interest on a loan.5
However, by exercising control over the conduct of the busi-
ness in addition to sharing in the profits, an investor is likely to
be held liable as a partner regardless of his intent. When pro-
ceeds or profits are used to repay advances to an enterprise, au-
thorities split as to whether the creditor should be held liable
as a partner even though he has no right to exercise control.6
But when profits are shared in lieu of interest only, modern au-
thorities generally agree that the investor should not be consid-
ered a partner unless he participates in the management or
control of the business.7 The most persuasive rationale for hold-
ing control to be a sine qua non of partnership liability is that
one should not be liable to creditors unless he was in a position
to distribute the risks of the enterprise to consumers through
his influence over costs and prices." Unfortunately, this ra-
tionale has not been articulated by the courts, though it is con-
sistent with results of prior decisions. Instead, courts consider
3. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4) (1915).
4. Id. § 7(4)(a).
5. Id. § 7(4)(d).
6. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAw OF PARTNERSHIP 82, 83
(1968).
7. Id. at 93-97.
8. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk
II, 38 YALE L.J. 720 (1929), which lays a theoretical framework, con-
sistent with case law, for determining the circumstances under which
partnership liability ought to be imposed.
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a wide variety of factors in addition to profit sharing and control,
which are thought to indicate an intent on the part of the in-
vestor to enter a partnership.0
B. FEDERAL TAX LAw
The Internal Revenue Code's definition of partnership is
even less valuable than the Uniform Partnership Act in distin-
guishing partnerships from other business forms. The Code
simply states:
[T~he term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool,joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or
by means of which any business, financial operation, or ven-
ture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of
this title, a corporation or a trust or estate.' 0
In only a few instances have courts been faced with difficult
problems of distinguishing partners from creditors for tax pur-
poses. Where the elements of profit sharing and the right to
control are both present, a partnership has clearly been formed.
However, unlike many state jurisdictions, it appears that one
will be classified as a partner for tax purposes if he advances
funds to a venture in return for a share of the profits even
though he retains no right to control." In Eugene C. Hartman,12
9. See J. C~mN- & A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 31-98.
10. INT. REV. CODE § 761(a).
11. A.L. Stanchfield, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1841 (1965); Eugene
C. Hartman, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 881 (1958); see Thompson v. Com-
missioner, 235 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1956); Levin v. Commissioner, 199
F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952). But see Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States,
340 F.2d 337 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (issue was liability for uncollectable with-
holding taxes); Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 867
(9th Cir. 1949) (state law applied). One commentator has cited Bale-
strieri in support of the proposition that the absence of control even
where there is a sharing of profits requires a finding of a debtor-
creditor relationship rather than a partnership. D. McDONALD, ET. AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF PARTNERS ANM PARTNERSHIPS 19 (1957).
However, the case was erroneously decided on the specific ground that
California law required control to be a necessary element of joint
ventures. The tax definition of partnership is a matter of federal law.
See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946). In the case of joint
ventures there is conflicting authority as to whether their existence
ought to be determined by state or federal law. Compare Frazell v.
United States, 213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd and remanded
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearing denied
per curiam, 339 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1964), with Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C.
1067 (1964); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp., 27 T.C. 840 (1957). The pre-
ferred view is that state law is not determinative. 6 J. MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.05 n.94.4 (1968 rev. ed.). There is
no reason to treat the tax definitions of partnership and joint venture
differently.
12. 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 881 (1958).
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the taxpayer advanced $5,000 to a transit company to finance the
operation of a ferry, and expressly disclaimed any intention of
being a partner. The loan was to be repaid out of the profits of
the ferry only and thereafter profits were to be split between the
taxpayer and company. Though the taxpayer, who had retained
only a right to an accounting, exercised no control over the oper-
ation, the Tax Court found a partnership to exist:
Where the party receiving the money assumes no obligation for
its return and it is subject to the hazard of the business, the
parties have been generally held to be joint venturers notwith-
standing the money is to be repaid with interest before the
net profits are to be divided.13
The argument that control is an essential element to finding a
partnership was rejected: "It is well settled that a partner or
joint adventurer may intrust performance to another."' 4
As with monetary financing, courts have found partnerships
to exist in the absence of effective provisions for control when
profits were to be shared in return for the contribution of a
physical asset.' 5 When the taxpayer's contribution has taken
the form of a lease, however, courts have considered control to
be a necessary element.' 6 Similarly, control has been thought
essential when profits are shared in m employer-employee rela-
tionship.17
C. ANALYTICAL CoNsmERATIoNs
The apparent lack of emphasis on the element of control by
courts in finding a partnership for tax purposes cannot be ex-
13. Id. at 884.
14. Id. This statement by the cou:rt, of course, fails to meet
directly the argument that control should be a necessary element.
The control requirement rarely means more than that one must have a
right to exercise control. Thus, one does net abdicate his right to control
by entrusting performance to another. However, in Hartman the tax-
payer never had even a right to control the operation of the ferry.
15. Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1963), in
which a taxpayer who had only a right to approve the final plan and
to share profits in return for the contribution of land to be developed and
subdivided by another was considered a patner. See also Beck Chem.
Equip. Corp., 27 T.C. 840 (1957), in which a taxpayer who shared profits
for the contribution of an invention was held to be a partner even
though the other party had the responsibility for financing, producing
and selling the product.
16. See Bowe-Burke Mining Co. v. Willcuts, 45 F.2d 394 (D. Minn.
1930); Roland P. Place, 17 T.C. 199, 206 (1951).
17. See Jessie James Finch, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 693, 696 (1955).
Cf. Bartholomew v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d. 315 (8th Cir. 1930).
[Vol. 54:805
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plained by theoretical considerations. The general approach
taken by tax courts, like state courts, has been to consider a wide
variety of elements which are thought to indicate the existence
of a partnership. This approach, however, provides no indica-
tion of the importance to be attached to each element, and thus
no definite standard has emerged. To compound this difficulty,
the ultimate test for tax purposes is said to be that of intent.
In this regard, courts frequently refer to the statement from the
family partnership case of Commissioner v. Culbertson'8 that
the only question is "whether, considering all the facts . . . the
parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."19 The
Culbertson intent test should be applied only to family partner-
ship situations where the good faith of the parties is in question.
Its use in other cases on the existence of partnerships has only
generated uncertainty as to the definition of partnership.20
Recognizing the inadequacy of the "intent" test as formu-
lated by the Culbertson majority, Justice Frankfurter, in a con-
curring opinion, reasoned that for tax purposes the definition of
a partnership should be controlled by the standards commonly
invoked under state law, disregarding local variants:
The term [partnership] carries its own meaning, just as does
"negligence" in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, because
such a common-law concept has a content familiar throughout
the country to those to whom the law speaks. The basic criteria
which determine its applicability have been so well and so
long established that they were implicitly incorporated by
the Internal Revenue Code's definition of "partnership." Con-
gress has thereby stamped a nationwide meaning upon the
term which disregards minor local variants or an occasional
legal sport.2 1
This view has considerable appeal. Adherence to it would have
prevented the divergence which has occurred between the defini-
tion of partnership used by state courts and the definition ap-
plied in tax cases. Furthermore, the failure of Congress to elabo-
rate on the meaning of the term partnership may indicate that
the term does in fact have a well understood meaning.
Frankfurter's approach, however, can be criticized on two
grounds. First, the criteria applied by state courts, particularly
18. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
19. Id. at 742.
20. 1 T. BAuIm & E. SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHPS LAW
AND TAxATION 34, 35 (1956, Supp. 1965).
21. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 751 (1949) (con-
curring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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the element of control, are essentially tests for determining who
is to be liable to the creditors of the enterprise in the event of
business failure.22 When a similar issue arises in a tax case-
for example, when the Treasury attempts to charge a party other
than the admitted owner of a business for tax liabilities of the
business-such criteria should likewise be applied. Thus, in
Arthur Venneri Company v. United States23 the court properly
held that a contractor who loaned money to his subcontractor in
return for a share of the profits was not liable for the subcon-
tractor's uncollectable withholding taxes on the ground that the
control element was absent. These same criteria, however, are
not necessarily the proper tests for deciding when to invoke the
rules set forth in subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code
which govern contributions of property, the determination of
distributive shares, liquidations, accounting procedures, sales of
partnership interests and the like.24 Second, nothing indicates
that Congress intended to limit tax courts to a rigid adherence
to the definition of partnership used by the state courts. On the
contrary, the language of section 761 of the Internal Revenue
Code suggests that some business arrangements not enumerated
therein might also be subject to partn3ership tax treatment.2 5
Fortunately, it is possible to develop a tax definition of part-
nership which is both reasonably consistent with state law and
based on theoretical considerations unique to tax law. For the
development of such a definition, it is helpful to focus on the
22. See Douglas, supra note 8.
23. 340 F.2d 337 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
24. It has been said, however, that:
There is no principle in tax law which requires or permits the
trier of facts to set up a special concept of partnership for tax
purposes or to treat the facts in a tax case differently from the
way they should be treated in any other kind of litigation.
Neil v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 563, 568 (1959).
25. Section 761 uses the word "includes." Tootal Broadhurst Lee
Co., 9 B.T.A. 321, 324 (1927), affd, 30 F.2d 239 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 861 (1929) indicates in a different context that when the word
"including" is not followed by words of an excluding nature such as
"only" the clauses are not to be considered all-inclusive. Moreover,
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (1956) adds that the Code definition of partnership
is "broader" than the common law definition. While the meaning of that
statement is uncertain, it may imply that the term partnership includes
similar organizations referred to by a different term such as joint
ventures. On the other hand, it may indicate that the Treasury supports
a definition of a partnership which is broader than the common rules
used by most state courts. See Sullivan, Conflicts Between State




case of A. L. Stanchfied.26 In that case, the taxpayer advanced
large sums of money to his son-in-law's construction company.
These advances were evidenced by promissory notes and were
carried on the taxpayer's books as loans receivable. In lieu of
interest, the taxpayer was to receive one half of the net profits
of a current construction contract. When the company encoun-
tered financial difficulties, the taxpayer contributed a few. minor
managerial services. In reply to the Commissioner's contention
that the uncollectable advances were nonbusiness bad debts, the
taxpayer argued that he was a partner, despite having previously
denied partner status in another legal proceeding. Therefore he
claimed an ordinary loss or, in the alternative, a business bad
debt deduction. The Tax Court, influenced by the services ren-
dered by the taxpayer on behalf of the partnership, held him to
be a partner even though he could not exercise control over
company policies.
Tax consequences should be based on the nature of one's
business activity rather than on whether he is engaged in such
activity as would make him liable to third parties. Thus, the
Stanchfield court properly looked to general evidence of partici-
pation in the business rather than whether the control standard
had been met. The distinction between "participation" and "con-
trol" cannot always be clearly drawn. Control, as used to fix
liability for business losses under state law, appears to require
an ability to influence both costs and prices.2 7  Thus, the mere
contribution of services which cannot significantly affect cost
and pricing policy and the exercise of negative powers, such as
the right to veto, are insufficient. But when participation is ex-
tensive and it relates to important aspects of the business opera-
tion, it becomes the practical equivalent of a share in control.
Therefore, a tax definition of partnership under which part-
ners are distinguished from creditors by the features of profit
sharing and significant participation would be fundamentally
consistent with the definition of partnerships employed by most
state courts. Unfortunately, the Stanchfield court was willing
to find a partnership when the taxpayer's participation was
slight. In performing services only after the company had run
into financial difficulty, the taxpayer's activity was characteristic
of a creditor attempting to protect his investment rather than of
one personally involved in the conduct of the enterprise.
26. 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1841 (1965).
27. See Douglas, supra note 8.
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In the cases where partnerships have been found to exist
in the absence of either the control element or significant partici-
pation by the taxpayer, the courts have generally been guilty of
inquiring into the existence of a partnership when that inquiry
was unnecessary. In Hartman, for example, the issue was merely
whether the taxpayer had a right to receive certain income from
the ferry operation. The court, by unnecessarily undertaking to
determine whether taxpayer was a partner, rendered a perverse
definition of partnership. The court could have reached the same
result by the doctrine of constructive receipt without determin-
ing whether or not the taxpayer was a partner.28
In Fishback v. United States,2 9 the case for inquiring into the
existence of a partnership was somewhat stronger since the issue
was whether the taxpayer was holding land for sale to customers.
Thus, the issue of whether the taxpayer was a partner in the
firm which made the ultimate sales was an appropriate thresh-
old question. Nevertheless, there was no compelling reason to
analyze the facts in partnership terms since the court could
have simply looked at the taxpayer's activity with respect to the
property independently and reached the same result.30 In
Stanchfield, however, the inflexible nature of the distinction be-
tween business and nonbusiness bad debts made inquiry into
the existence of a partnership essential. Since participation is
not a factor which aids in determiniag whether one is in the
business of lending money, the degree of participation by the tax-
payer in his son-in-law's business would not have aided the court
in determining whether the debt was business or nonbusiness.
Though, as a general rule, the tax definition of partnership
should require the element of either significant participation or
control, an exception must be made for those investment ar-
rangements which are analogous to limited partnerships. Lim-
ited partnerships, in which the element of control by the limited
partners must be absent by definition,3 ' contemplate that the
limited partners will receive a proportionate interest in the capi-
tal of the business-an interest which could not be considered a
debt in either substance or form. It follows that relationships
similar to limited partnerships, which have always been included
28. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1956).
29. 215 F. Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1963).
30. Such an approach was taken in W. E. Anderson, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem 1170 (1964).
31. UmFomW Lim m PumInEasmp ACT § 7 (1915).
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within the meaning of the term partnership under section 761,82
should be accorded the same treatment even though they fail to
comply with the state limited partnership provisions. For ex-
ample, in Thompson v. Commissioner33 the court properly denied
a bad debt deduction to one who signed what purported to be a
limited partnership agreement even though the limited partner-
ship certificate required by state law was never obtained. The
court reasoned that in order to constitute a bad debt, the transac-
tion must have first created an "unconditional obligation to re-
pay."34 Presumably the same result would be reached even in
the absence of any intent to form a limited partnership so long
as the substance of the transaction is similar to that in Thomp-
son. Thus, if an agreement clearly contemplates that an in-
vestor is to have a proportionate interest in the capital of the
business as well as a share in the profits, he should be considered
a partner for tax purposes regardless of whether he exercises
control or participates in the business.
III. ACHIEVING ORDINARY LOSS TREATMENT
Many promoters who withdraw from relationships similar to
those in Stanchfield or Hartman and who are unaware of the
possibility that they may be considered a partner for tax pur-
poses though they are considered creditors under state law are
likely to treat the losses they have suffered as either business
or nonbusiness bad debts, whichever appears most applicable to
them. If the promoter applies for a business bad debt deduction
from ordinary income and the Commissioner determines that he
is a partner, he may have missed an opportunity to cast his with-
drawal transaction in such a form as to assure ordinary loss
treatment for his terminal losses. Tax planning techniques
which obtain ordinary loss treatment for terminal losses incident
to a partnership liquidation are likely to be of special interest to
business promoters in these situations.
32. See Francis L. Burns, 13 B.T.A. 293 (1928); Taubman, Limited
Partnerships, 3 CoRP. PRAc. Com. 15 (Feb. 1962). But see Annie Stevens
Woodruff, 38 B.T.A. 739 (1938), nonacquiesced in, 1939-1 Cum. BuLL.
69, in which the court refused to apply the general partnership rule
which provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on partnership distri-
butions in kind to limited partnerships. There is no justification for
such a distinction between ordinary partnerships and limited partner-
ships. P. LrrLF FnnmnA INcoME TAxATiox OF P ATNEss § 8.10, at
178 (1952).
33. 235 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1956).
34. Id. at 602.
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The return of a portion of the taxpayer's investment from an
enterprise under circumstances similar to those involved in
Stanchfield might be considered a distribution in liquidation of
a partnership interest under section 736 (b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.8 5 Liquidating distributions bring into operation the
general rules for recognition of gain or loss set out in section
731.88 Under this provision, gain or loss is recognized if the dis-
tribution consists entirely of money, unrealized receivables or
inventory. Any gain or loss that is recognized on such a distribu-
tion is considered gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a
partnership interest and, subject to certain exceptions, is treated
as a capital gain or loss.3 7 Thus, if the investor, erroneously be-
lieving himself to be a creditor, accepts cash in liquidation of his
interest he will be held to a capital 'loss for the difference be-
tween the adjusted basis of his partnership interest and the
amount distributed.
38
Since the above result is likely to be considerably less satis-
factory to the taxpayer than if the loss is characterized as a busi-
ness bad debt, the taxpayer should examine the possibilities of
shaping the liquidating transaction in such a way as to achieve
ordinary loss treatment regardless of the tax characterization of
his relationship.
A. USE OF SECTION 1231 ASSETS
The taxpayer can obtain ordinary loss treatment for terminal
losses by receiving an item of depreciable property used in the
trade or business as described in section 1231. When any amount
of property other than unrealized receivables or inventory items
is included in a distribution, no gain or loss is recognized.3 9 The
basis of such property in the hands of the distributee-taxpayer
is equal to the adjusted basis of his interest in the partnership
reduced only by the amount of money distributed to him in the
35. A distribution in liquidation of a partnership interest differs
from the sale of a partnership interest which is governed by section
741. If the enterprise continues to operate after taxpayer's withdrawal,
the question may arise as to whether the payments made to tax-payer
were distributions in liquidation of his interest or constituted a sale
of his interest to the remaining partners. 'For a discussion of the prob-
lems of distinguishing liquidations from sales, see Swihart, Tax Prob-
lems Raised by Liquidations of Partnership Interests, 44 Tax. L. REV.
1209, 1223-41 (1966).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1-736-1(b) (1) (1956).





same transaction. 40 The sale of section 1231 property, unlike
other assets, can result in ordinary loss to the taxpayer. Thus,
the distributee-taxpayer can shift what would otherwise be a
capital loss into an ordinary loss merely by shaping the transac-
tion to include section 1231 property.41 Also, by holding the
property, he can postpone recognition of the loss until such time
as he chooses to sell it.
Furthermore, through a non-pro rata distribution of the
partnership's section 1231 property, the total amount of the part-
nership's loss which can be treated as an ordinary loss by the
individual partners is greater than it would be under a pro rata
distribution of such assets. This can be illustrated by the follow-
ing example: A and B are equal partners of a partnership which
has an adjusted basis of $200,000 and assets consisting of $40,000
cash, section 1231 property with a market value of $30,000 and a
basis to the partnership of $60,000, and capital assets with a value
of $30,000 and a basis to the partnership of $100,000. If A re-
ceives the $40,000 cash and section 1231 property with a basis of
$20,000 and a value of $10,000, the basis of such property to A
upon distribution would equal the adjusted basis of his partner-
ship interest ($100,000) less the amount of money included ($40,-
000), or $60,000.42 Upon sale of the property as a section 1231
asset at its market value of $10,000, A would realize an ordinary
loss of $50,000. B's basis, however, must be allocated to the
properties distributed to him in proportion to their adjusted
bases to the partnership.43 Thus, the capital assets distributed to
him would have a basis of $71,429 while the section 1231 assets
would have a basis of $28,571. 44 Upon the sale of this property,
B would realize a capital loss of $41,42945 and an ordinary loss of
$8,57146 respectively. If, on the other hand, the distribution was
pro rata, each partner would allocate a basis of $30,000 to section
1231 property and $50,000 to capital assets. Upon the eventual
sale of the property, each would realize an ordinary loss of $15,-
40. Id. § 732(b).
41. See S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN 1145
(1960); 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 11, § 35.54 n.5.
42. INT. Rnv. CoDE § 732(b).
43. Id. § 732(c) (2).
44. B's basis of $100,000 must be allocated between capital and
section 1231 assets in the ratio of 100,000 (the basis of the capital assets
to the partnership) to 40,000 (the basis of the remaining section 1231
assets to the partnership). Hence, the properties take on a basis of
$71,429 and $28,571 (respectively).
45. $71,429 less a market value of $30,000.
46. $28,571 less a market value of $20,000.
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000 and a capital loss of $35,000. Thus, in the case of a pro rata
distribution, a total of $30,000 is deducted from ordinary income
of the partners compared with a totel ordinary loss of $58,57147
in the case of the non-pro rata distribution. Since the partners
themselves can control the allocation of the particular assets,
the benefits of ordinary loss treatment can be shifted to the part-
ner who can best utilize them.
It is also desirable to minimize the amount of property other
than section 1231 property which is distributed to the party
seeking to maximize his ordinary loss treatment. The reason for
this is that any remaining basis, after accounting for money,
unrealized receivables and inventory items, is allocated to other
distributed properties in proportion to their adjusted bases to the
partnership.48 Thus, inclusion of other forms of property may
greatly reduce the amount of the basis of section 1231 property
which can eventually be recognized as ordinary loss.
There are two potential pitfalls which the taxpayer must
avoid when attempting to utilize section 1231 assets in a liquidat-
ing distribution. First, he should be certain that the particular
items of property have been held by the partnership for at least
six months prior to the distribution. Otherwise, courts might
consider such property an inventory iem under a literal reading
of section 751(d) (2) (B). That section includes within the defini-
tion of inventory items, "any other property of the partnership
which, on sale or exchange by the partnership, would be consid-
ered property other than a capital asset and other than property
described in section 1231." (Emphasis added.) Depreciable
property held less than six months would not be a "capital asset"
since section 1221(2) specifically excludes property used in a
trade or business which is subject to a depreciation allowance.
Nor would such property be "property described in section 1231"
since section 1231 refers only to property held more than six
months. Moreover, the description contained therein is stated
in section 1231(b) to apply only "for purposes of this section
.... " Thus, the taxpayer would be unable to fulfill the six
month holding requirement for section 1231 treatment by using
the asset in a trade or business of his own for only a portion of
that period. Professor Willis believes that this interpretation is
technically correct, even though he considers it a distortion of the
47. As mentioned in the text A could realize an ordinary loss of
$50,000 and B an ordinary loss of $8,571.
48. INT. REV. CODE § 732 (c) (2).
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intended operation of section 751 and an apparent drafting
error.
49
Second, it has been suggested that section 731, which af-
fords nonrecognition of loss for liquidating distributions con-
taining property, might not be read literally if the liquidation
contains a purely nominal amount of property.50 Since the tax-
payer may be attempting to optimize the total ordinary loss
available from the liquidating transaction by taking only a single
piece of section 1231 property with the money distributed to him,
thereby making more of such property available to the other
partners, he should be aware of this possibility. However, sec-
tion 731, which was based on a Congressional intent "to reduce
to a minimum the cases involving recognition of gain or loss,"51
is quite explicit in postponing the recognition of a loss unless
"no property"5 2 is distributed. Even more absolute language is
used in the regulations which accompany section 73153 and in the
Senate committee report.5 4
49. A. WLmLs, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERsEHnP TAXATION 197-98 (1957).
50. Jackson, et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partner-
ships, 54 COLum. L. REv. 1183, 1228 n.87 (1954) states:
It should be noted that under a literal interpretation of this
rule a bag of peanuts could receive a million dollar basis, if
a partner with a very high basis for his partnership interest
merely received that property in liquidation. However, in a
situation involving de ninimis property, the million dollar loss
would probably be recognized.
6 J. MERTENS, supra note 11, § 35.54, at 189 comes to the same con-
clusion: "In order to avoid absurdity the Secretary and the courts would
seem to be entitled to disregard de minimis distributions of property."
51. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) cited in 3 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 5031 (1954).
52. INT. REv. CODE § 731(b).
53. According to the regulations:
Loss is recognized to a partner only upon liquidation of his en-
tire interest in the partnership, and only if the property dis-
tributed to him consists solely of money, unrealized receiv-
ables . . ., and inventory items .... If the partner whose
interest is liquidated receives any property other than money,
unrealized receivables, or inventory items, then no loss will
be recognized. (emphasis added).
Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a) (2) (1956). The term "solely" as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in similar circumstances "leaves no leeway."
Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942). Never-
theless, the de minimis doctrine may still be applicable to explicit
language of the sort used in section 731. See Mills v. Commissioner, 331
F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1964).
54. 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 51, at 5031. The
House version would have recognized loss on liquidating distributions
regardless of whether property was included. The American Law
Institute proposed draft provided for recognition of loss on liquidation
distributions whenever the realized loss exceeded twice the value
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Under the present distribution rules of subchapter K, noth-
ing prevents taxpayers from converting terminal capital losses
into ordinary losses by means of a distribution of section 1231
property. 55 While the present incidence of tax avoidance
through such elaborate distribution schemes may well be minor,
the loophole could be closed without prejudice to legitimate
business motives. Congress could add a provision that distribu-
tions made for tax avoidance purposes will be subject to the
rules governing sales of partnership interests.56 Such a provi-
sion, also covering avoidance possibilities other than those dis-
cussed above, would be similar to section 704(b), relating to tax
avoidance purposes in the determination of distributive shares.
A second remedy would be to add a clause limiting the distribu-
tee's basis in section 1231 property to the adjusted basis of such
property in the hands of the partner:ship whenever the value of
the total liquidating distribution is less than the adjusted basis
of his partnership interest.
B. ABANDoimENT
If the taxpayer's withdrawal from the partnership is charac-
of the property included in the distribution. See 2 A.L.L FEDERAL
INCOME TAX STATUTE DRAFT 392-93 (1954). This provision would have
eliminated the situation of low-value property carrying a high basis but
would have created some valuation difficulties. Prior to enactment of
the 1954 Code, loss was recognized if the liquidating distribution con-
tained a relatively insubstantial amount of property. C.K. Boettcher,
8 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1 39,353 (1939). When the distribution consisted
almost entirely of property, loss was not recognized. Annie Laurie
Crawford, 39 B.T.A. 521 (1939). But when limited partners were in-
volved, loss was recognized even though the distribution consisted en-
tirely of property. Annie Stevens Woodruff, 38 B.T.A. 739 (1938). In
that case limited partners were distinguished from general partners on
the dubious ground that the rights of the limited partners upon dissolu-
tion are limited to their contribution. Id at 745. The court also
erroneously suggested that the provisions for partnership distribution
were not applicable to limited partners but only defined the rights of
partnerships generally. Id. It is doubtful that the case could be
authority for the proposition that distributions from organizations which
had the attributes of limited partnerships should be controlled by rules
other than those of subchapter K since section 761 defines partnership
for purposes of the entire subchapter.
55. See text accompanying notes 41-50 supra.
56. See statement of A. Willis, chairman, Advisory Group on sub-
chapter K, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, in
ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON S"BCRAPTERS C, J & K or THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 73 (1959). The advisory group did not recom-
mend such a provision but suggested that it might be added if the




terized as an "abandonment" rather than either a "distribution"
or a "sale or exchange" of his interest, he is not subject to the
loss calculations required by subchapter K. Prior to addition
of the distribution sections to the 1954 Code, courts held that
when the partnership agreement required any withdrawing part-
ner to forfeit his interest, such partner was entitled to a deduc-
tion from ordinary income.57 Thus, the investor whose "loan" is
to be repaid only out of the profits of the business could treat
his loss as ordinary under section 165(c) because he would not
be entitled to a distribution upon termination of the enterprise.
Similarly, if the withdrawing partner has a right to payment
out of the assets of the enterprise but the firm's liabilities exceed
those assets upon his withdrawal, the taxpayer should be allowed
a deduction from ordinary income so long as he is not liable to
creditors under state law.58
Just as use of section 1231 assets achieved an ordinary loss
for taxpayer when the business has remaining assets, treatment
of the withdrawal as an abandonment may secure ordinary loss
when the business has nothing left. However, if the taxpayer
has liabilities to creditors, as one would likely have if considered
a partner under state law, which are assumed by the other
partners upon his withdrawal, a distribution rather than an
abandonment would occur and the taxpayer would be held to
have sustained a capital loss.5 9 The reason for this result is that
"[a] ny decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partner-
ship ... shall be considered as a distribution of money to the
partner by the partnership."60
C. APPLICATION OF THE CORN PRODUCTS DocmRrN
TO PARTNERSHIPS
When a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business as an indi-
57. Gaius G. Gannon, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951); Palmer Hutcheson, 17
T.C. 14 (1951).
58. See Rev. Rul. 66-93, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 165. (when a limited
partnership became insolvent, placed in receivership and terminated
during the same year as the loss and the limited partners are unable to
recover any part of their respective capital contributions to the part-
nership, the limited partners are considered to have sustained an ordi-
nary loss under sections 165 (a) and (c) (1)). There is no substantive
distinction between the limited partner described above and the in-
vestor considered a partner for tax purposes who is also unable to re-
cover a share of his contribution so long as he would not have been
liable to creditors under state law.
59. Andrew 0. Stilwell, 46 T.C. 247 (1966) (offering no opinion
as to the continued vitality of Gannon and Hutcheson).
60. INT. REv. CODE § 752 (b).
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vidual or partner makes a loan for the purpose of supporting
his own business (usually to insure a source of supply), any
losses incurred are usually deductible as business bad debts.0 1
However, even if the taxpayer is considered taxable as a partner
rather than a creditor, it is arguable that the gain or loss recog-
nized in a cash distribution to him should be regarded as ordi-
nary.
Following the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in
Corn Products Refining Company v. Commissioner, 2 courts have
allowed business expense or ordinary loss deductions when de-
bentures or stocks are purchased to secure a source of supply or
a steady customer and later sold at a 0loss.6 In rejecting a literal
reading of the language of section 12.1, the Corn Products Court
held that property not specifically excluded from the definition
of a capital asset contained in that section could nevertheless be
excluded if the property is held by the taxpayer incidental to his
business rather than for investment purposes. The Court justi-
fied this departure from the language of section 1221 on the
ground that "Congress intended that profits and losses arising
from the everyday operation of a business be considered as ordi-
nary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss."' ' 4
If this policy was intended to preclude a literal application
of all Code sections which provide for capital asset treatment,
there is no reason to deny ordinary loss on a cash partnership
distribution when the partnership interest was purchased for
a purpose like securing a source of supply. The Code, however,
expressly provides that gain or loss recognized on a partnership
61. See Lewis, Deductibility of Losses Arising from. Business Ven-
tures, S. CAL. 1966 TAx. INST. 625, 642-52.
62. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
63. John J. Grier Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1964) (stock of lessor purchased to avoid objection to assignment of
lease held incidental to business and not for investment); Hagan v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (sole purpose of in-
vesting in stock was to protect and retain a reliable purchaser of em-
ployer's products); Journal Co. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.
Wis. 1961) (loss sustained by taxpayer i newspaper publishing busi-
ness on sale of stock it acquired in paper mill for purpose of obtaining
newsprint held deductible as ordinary business expense); Smith & Wel-
ton v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1958) (stock purchased
to secure a source of supply held to be a business expense); Missisquoi
Corp., 37 T.C. 791, 795-96 (1962) (debentures purchased to secure a
source of supply); McMillan Mortgage Co., 36 T.C. 924 (1961) (stock
purchased as a condition of making sales held a business expense not a
capital asset); Electrical Fittings Corp., 33 T.C. 1026 (1960) (stock pur-
chased to secure a source of supply).
64. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
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distribution is to be considered a sale or exchange of a partner-
ship interest,6 5 and thus, treated as a sale or exchange of a capital
asset under section 741. While apparently no cases have chal-
lenged the literal reading of section 741, it has been suggested
that the literal interpretation should not be followed where a
person is engaged in the business of holding partnership inter-
ests for sale to customers.68 It is doubtful that Congress, by en-
acting section 741, intended to supersede the general policy of
ordinary income treatment in such situations. Though Corn
Products was addressed only to section 1221, the policy behind
instituting what was in effect an amendment to that section
applies with equal force to section 741.
D. WHEN TO FIE AS A PARTNERSHIP
Unlike the partner who must claim his operating losses as
the partnership incurs them, the creditor must wait until the
debt is uncollectable before he can claim his deduction. There-
fore, in addition to the capital treatment of terminal losses, a
surprise determination by the Commissioner that taxpayer is a
partner for tax purposes could result in a denial of loss deduc-
tions for years barred by the statute of limitations. For this
reason, a taxpayer in doubt as to his status would often be wise
to amend his return at the time he withdraws his investment
from the enterprise. If successful, the operating losses of the en-
terprise could be spread over several years rather than lumped
in a single bad debt deduction.67
The question of whether to file a partnership return initially
when the taxpayer enters into the transaction and is uncertain
as to how the taxing authorities might classify him for tax pur-
poses is more complicated. By filing a partnership return at this
time the possibility that some losses might be barred by the
statute of limitations is avoided. However, state courts have
65. INT. REV. CODE § 731.
66. 6 J. MERTEx.s, LAw or FEDAuL INcowr TAxATION § 35.55 n.54
(1968 Rev. ed.).
67. It should be pointed out that such a strategy should not be fol-
lowed if there are outstanding creditors of the firm who have not been
satisfied at the time of taxpayer's withdrawal and there remains a possi-
bility that they will attempt to hold taxpayer liable as a partner in a
subsequent state court proceeding. As indicated by the cases cited in
note 68 infra state courts often look to the fact of filing a partnership
tax return as evidence of intent to be a partner. Thus, the filing of a
partnership return could increase the possibility that taxpayer would
be held liable. Taxpayer should be able to ascertain whether there are
likely to be unsatisfied creditors at the time he withdraws from the firm.
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frequently considered the filing of a partnership return signifi-
cant evidence of an intent to form a. partnership. 8 Thus, in a
doubtful case, the filing of a partnership return could defeat the
taxpayer's expectations of limited liability in a state proceeding
if the business failed. Such a consequence could obviously be
far more disastrous to the taxpayer than the possibility that a
later determination that the taxpayer was a partner could pre-
vent the taxpayer from claiming losses from barred years. More-
over, since most businesses either succeed or fail in their first
few years of operation, the likelihood that substantial losses
could be barred is likely to be minimal.
IV. SUMMARY
A satisfactory test by which partners can be distinguished
from creditors for tax purposes has not yet emerged. On the
basis of existing case law it appears that many investors who
would be considered creditors under state law will be classified
as partners under the Internal Revenue Code. Recognizing the
uncertainty of these classifications, the taxpayer can increase his
chances of obtaining ordinary loss treatment of his terminal
losses through several tax planning devices, especially the use of
section 1231 assets.
68. See Clauson v. Department of Fin., 377 Ill. 399, 36 N.E.2d 714
(1941); Guthrie v. Foster, 256 Ky. 753, 76 S.W.2d 927 (1934); M. Lit.
Inc. v. Berger, 225 Md. 241, 170 A.2d 303 (1961); Barnes v. Barnes, 355
Mich. 458, 94 N.W.2d 829; Cullingworth v. Pollard, 201 Va. 498, 111 S.E.2d
810 (1960).
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